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Global Value Chains (GVCs) have been one of the main transmission mechanisms of 2009 the Great Trade 
Collapse. Our paper provides a description of the effects of the crisis from a perspective that is both 
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1 Introduction 
A sizeable body of literature over the past twenty five years considers that a structural 
change in the productive economy has occurred as a further consequence of the ICT 
revolution, the steady lowering of trade barriers and transport costs (Feenstra, 1998), and 
the changing nature of multinational enterprises (Saliola and Zanfei, 2009).1 The outcome 
is a new international division of labor in which the production of final products is 
fragmented in Global Value Chains (GVCs henceforth). Under this interpretation (Gereffi 
and Fernandez-Stark, 2011, for an overview of GVCs), one may consider the production 
process for any given good as a continuum of tasks assigned to the various productive 
units; these tasks can be performed in several different places around the world. The 
organization of production varies continually, with each task offshored to the country 
where the production and international transaction costs are lowest. 
In the face of the 2008-09 great recession, the systemic importance of GVCs proved to be 
significant. According to several studies, GVCs acted, throughout different channels, for 
the rapid transmission of real and financial shocks, thus amplifying the national 
fluctuations of demand for final goods. Baldwin (2009) holds that the synchrony of the 
collapse in world trade was precisely caused by the input-output linkages in GVCs. 
What happened to firms operating inside the value chains? Did firms’ position in the value 
chain play a role in their performance during the crisis? Were firms’ individual 
characteristics and firms’ strategies relevant determinants of their resilience? The aim of 
this paper is to answer to these questions by taking a look at the firm level evidence.  
Exploiting the dataset coming from the EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-UniCredit survey (henceforth 
EFIGE), we first outline which are firms’ main modes of participating to a GVC. We then 
assess the interactions between firms’ position in the value chains and their 
performances, by looking at sales dynamics during the 2008-09 crisis. 
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In this study we concentrate on the German and Italian part of the EFIGE dataset. 
Germany and Italy are somewhat paradigmatic countries and provide to be an interesting 
area of analysis for several reasons. They are both highly industrialized countries and 
leaders in EU manufacturing exports; industrial firms of both countries are substantially 
involved in and affected by globalization; a large share of firms (higher in the Italian 
industry) work exclusively as intermediate firms, a key factor in our analyses to explain 
heterogeneous resilience to the crisis. 
The 2008-09 crisis is a particularly interesting case. First, it was quite unexpected and 
originated from the US financial crisis of the summer of 2007. This implies that it can be 
considered exogenous to the German and Italian economic conditions. Second, the 
downturn was particularly severe. German and Italian GDP fell by, respectively, 4 and 7 
per cent in two years; in this light, the crisis can be considered as a serious “stress test” for 
firm’s strategic decisions. 
This paper contributes to the literature under at least three points of view. First, we make 
a cross-country analysis of two developed and highly industrialized economies; this is an 
important issue since most of the existing literature focuses on emerging markets firms 
and their chances to access GVCs. Second, unlike developing countries in which 
intermediate firms prevail, advanced economies are characterized by the coexistence of 
both final and intermediate firms; this implies that they are on the verge to become either 
a “headquarter” or a “factory economy” (Baldwin, 2011). By analyzing firm performance 
during a great economic shock, we are able to understand which is the “best” 
specialization of a country under “extreme” economic conditions. Third, as heterogeneity 
matters, the analysis of the micro dynamics at firm level is particularly relevant in terms of 
strategies and their ability to face a major macroeconomic shock. It is also important from 
a policy maker point of view as it can be learnt which typology of firms are more 
vulnerable to crisis. This is a truly under-researched issue as there are only two papers 
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that analyze this topic under a different perspective (Altomonte et al., 2012; Bekes et al., 
2011; see next section of a literature review).  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 analyzes the very recent debate on the 
role of GVCs as transmission mechanisms of the 2008-09 financial crisis and the firm level 
impact and makes a comparison between Italy and Germany in terms of differences, 
similarities and firms’ involvement in GVCs; Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 is 
dedicated to the descriptive analysis. Section 5 analyzes the performance of the firms 
during the crisis by setting up the estimation methods and presenting the main results. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2  Firms in GVCs, facing the great recession 
 
2.1 Literature review 
“World trade experienced a sudden, severe, and synchronized collapse in late 2008 – the 
sharpest in recorded history and deepest since WWII” (Baldwin, 2009). World trade in 
manufactures fell by about 30 per cent between the first half of 2008 and the first half of 
2009 (WTO, 2009). The fall in trade during the crisis has also been quite homogeneous 
across all countries: more than 90 per cent of OECD countries have exhibited 
simultaneously a decline in exports and imports exceeding 10 per cent (Martins and 
Araújo, 2009). European Union countries were severely affected both in terms of decrease 
of industrial production and merchandise trade. 
According to the recent work of several researchers, GVCs played a leading role in the 
transmission of the shocks in the 2008-09 crisis, causing the Great Trade Collapse. Why 
were GCVs regarded as the main propagation of the global downturn? Which were the 
transmission mechanisms? According to Freund (2009) and Cheung and Guichard (2009), 
this has happened because the share of intermediate products in international trade has 
greatly increased over recent decades. In this vein, the main idea is that vertical 
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specialization and links among firms have determined a reduction of the intermediate 
demand that was sharper than the one that would be implied by the “standard trade 
channel” (Bems et al., 2010). In Yi (2009), this happened because the same component 
might be exchanged several times (and crosses several national borders) before it is finally 
incorporated in the final product.  A slight different point of view is taken by the literature 
that singles out “the cascading effects of disruption along the supply chain” (Carvalho et 
al., 2014: 12). They suggest that the origin of aggregate fluctuations can be traced back to 
any shock taking place at a specific unit operating along the chain. Because of the firms’ 
interconnectedness, such a disturbance will cascade down across all the firms, thus 
impacting on the aggregate behavior.2 Alessandria et al. (2011) test another likely channel 
of transmission based on the inventory adjustments firms adopt to face a demand 
reduction. As a consequence of a reduction in the final demand, final firms decreased 
orders across GVCs firms, the decrease will be amplified for firms located far away from 
the final customer. Such an adjustment inventories mechanism resembles the well-known 
bullwhip effect (Forrester, 1961). While Altomonte et al. (2012), working on a firm level, 
confirm that inventory adjustments along GVCs greatly contributed to the great trade 
decrease. Escaith et al. (2010) only partially agree on the role played by the “inventory 
effect”, underlying that other factors might also be at work.  
 
Being the GVCs a transmission mechanism of the great crisis, the next important questions 
become: what happened inside the GVCs? Which type of firms involved in the GVCs were 
the most hit? To what extent their position (intermediate or final) along GVCs and their 
individual characteristics (such as size) and strategies (innovation, imports, human capital) 
played a role in their performance during the crisis? Surprisingly enough, given the policy 
relevance of the matter, here the evidence is very scant, as there are very few studies 
based on firm level analysis. 
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In particular, we can recall just two contributions. Altomonte et al. (2012) introduce a 
peculiar modes of organization of inter-firm linkages as a key factor to explain firms’ 
different resilience during the crisis. In their analyses, based on a representative sample of 
French firms, they single out two organizational modes: the first one pursued by 
multinational firms that entail trade among related parties; according to the second one, 
the relationship between buyer and supplier is carried out by arm’s length trade. They 
found that trade originated within hierarchies of firms (i.e. transactions among firms 
belonging to a group) reacted faster to the negative demand shock, but also recovered 
faster in the following months than arm’s length trade: “our explanatory hypothesis is that 
the internalization of activities within the boundary of a group allows for a better 
management of information flows coming from the bottom of the value chain so that 
production and inventories can be more swiftly adjusted to demand shocks” (Altomonte 
et al., 2012: 22). 
Békés et al. (2011), in a highly comprehensive report on European firms, shed some more 
light on the link between firms’ heterogeneity and their reaction to the crisis. One of their 
key findings is that firm’s positioning in GVCs do matter. On the basis of the EFIGE dataset 
they show that, on average, intermediate firms suffered the most in terms of greater sales 
reduction, while outsourcers mitigate the effects of the crisis. Firms’ characteristics also 
played a role as large and controlling firms fared better. 
 
2.2 Italian and German firms in the GVCs 
 
From a static point of view, Germany and Italy are similar under many respects.3 
Manufacturing is prominent in both countries: in 2010, in Germany equals to 25.3 per cent 
of total value added and in Italy 23.3 per cent. Both countries exhibit high levels of 
manufacturing exports, share of exports to German GDP is 39.9 per cent, in Italy 23.4 per 
cent. The organization of production structure is quite similar as well: family-owned 
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German firms represent almost 90 per cent of total firms, 86 per cent in Italy (Bugamelli et 
al., 2012).  
A starker difference is, instead, represented by the size of the firms: the average number 
of employees in Italian firms was 9 in 2009, while in Germany was 37. As highlighted by 
Barba Navaretti et al. (2011), such structural dimensional difference, industry invariant, 
represents a strong advantage of Germany, in terms of productivity, internationalization, 
innovation strategies. 
Both countries share a great involvement in GVCs. Largely as outward processing trade, 
the global operation of firms started quite early in Germany (Helg and Tajoli, 2005) and 
accelerated around the 1990’s, after the unification process, with the increasing 
commercial integration with Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Hungary. Foreign 
outsourcing started somewhat later in Italy (in the second half of the ‘90s) as a firms’ 
reaction strategy to shocks such as: stronger competitive pressure from Eastern European 
and Asian producers; exchange rate constraints before the introduction of the single 
European currency; and the development and spread of ICTs (Giunta et al., 2012). 
As underlined by Breda and Cappariello (2012), if the direct and indirect import content of 
the production of goods and services is taken as an indicator of international outsourcing, 
we can appreciate another similarity between the two countries. In 2007, such indicator 
was around 17 per cent for both the Italian and the German economies: “on this basis and 
from a static viewpoint, also Italy could be defined as a «bazaar economy»” (Breda and 
Cappariello, 2012: 133).4 Further proof of both countries involvement in GVCs operations 
comes from the participation index (Oecd, 2012):5 Italy index participation value in 2009 
appear to be slight below the German one. The important question also concerns whether 
Germany and Italy also share the same position in the value chain, in fact a country can be 
upstream or downstream according to its specialization. Here the evidence is not a 
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conclusive one, as a country’s position considerably varies according to the data used. 
However, some hints come from the firm level analysis on which we turn.  
 
 
3 Data and descriptive statistics 
 
3.1 The EFIGE dataset  
For the comparative analysis of firms in the GVCs between Germany and Italy, we use the 
EFIGE survey. The data have been collected within the EFIGE project – European firms in a 
global economy: internal policies for external competitiveness – supported by the 
Research Directorate General of the European Commission. The EFIGE survey was 
conducted in 2009. The sample includes around 3,000 firms for France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain, more than 2,200 firms for UK, and 500 firms for Austria and Hungary. 
Sampling design follows a stratification by sector and firm size, that induces an 
oversampling for large firms. 
The survey questionnaire contains both qualitative and quantitative data on firms’ 
characteristics and activities, split into six sections providing different pieces of 
information on: structure of the firm; workforce; investment; technological innovation and 
R&D; internationalization; finance; market and pricing.6 Data from the survey was then 
matched with balance sheet information from Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk).7 
As this paper focuses on the two major industrial economies of the Euro area, we make 
use of the Italian and German firm data. This should leave us with slightly less than 6,000 
observations. However, the number of firms actually used in the analysis is much lower 
(slightly more than 4,000, roughly 2,000 for each country) due to the presence of several 
missing values in the balance sheet data. 
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3.2 Variables and descriptive statistics 
In order to analyze the impact of the participation to a Value chain on firm performance 
during the crisis, we first have to qualify how to measure a firm participation. 
Finding a firm-level proxy for the participation to a Value chain is not an easy task. In 
principle, we should exploit a dataset that contains information on all firm-to-firms 
linkages including the type of products bought and sold by each firm. At the best of our 
knowledge, these kind of data are not available for European countries;8 therefore, by 
using our firm level dataset, we proxy the participation to a Value chain with two 
variables. 
The first variable indicates whether a firm participates to a Value chain as a supplier (i.e. in 
an upstream position). We use the information contained in the share of total turnover 
made up by sales of produced-to-order goods to other firms (Share of produced-to-order, 
SPTO henceforth). Produced-to-order strategies allow customers to purchase products 
that are specific to their needs. This is likely to approximate in the best way the strict 
vertical relationships that are usually established in a VC. In the paper we use a discretized 
version of SPTO, that is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is fully intermediate 
(INT, henceforth; SPTO equal to 100). There are three reasons for this. The first is that it 
allows to easily interpret the coefficient when we interact it with other dummy variables. 
The second one is that other available measures on the positioning in the GVCs are 
discrete and this would create an undesired asymmetry between the measurement of 
upstreamness and downstreamness. Third, discretizing SPTO does not generate a very 
large loss of information. The distribution of SPTO is bimodal, with a mass of firms on zero 
and another mass on 100.9  
EFIGE data also allow to detect whether the main customers of the produced-to-order 
goods reside within the national borders or abroad; in the first case the firm participates 
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to a national Value chain (INT-DMC); in the second to a GVC (INT-FMC). As we will see, 
these types of firms present relevant differences in terms of strategies and characteristics. 
The second variable proxies firm participation to GVC as a purchaser (i.e. in a downstream 
position). We use a dummy equal to one if the firm buys from abroad customized 
intermediate goods (Customized purchases of intermediaries, CPI henceforth), that is 
components which are exclusively manufactured for the firm.  
Reference year for all these variables is 2008. 
Descriptive statistics are reported in table 1.  
First of all it should be noted that the average number of employees is 55; this means that 
the EFIGE dataset is, as already mentioned, representative of medium and large firms. In 
the face of the crisis, sales displayed on average a dramatic drop (-17.9 per cent); however 
the standard deviation is also quite high, thus reflecting a large heterogeneity in firm 
performance. Table 1 also shows that SPTO is quite large. On average, more than three-
fourth of a firm’s sales is made up of selling of customized intermediate goods to other 
firms. The share of fully intermediate firms (INT) is quite high (50.3 per cent) and quite 
equally split between those with national main customers (INT-DMC) and foreign main 
customers (INT-FMC). Conversely, only a small portion of firms (5.6 per cent) purchases 
customized intermediaries (CPI); this means that the actual number of firms in a 
downstream position is very limited in the dataset. 
 A small share of intermediate firms (4.8 per cent) are also engaged in the purchase of 
specialized intermediaries (INT&CPI): these are a group of intermediate companies (INT) 
that, apparently, succeeded in organizing their own supply chain. 
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4 Descriptive analysis  
 
4.1 How do Italian and German firms participate to Value chains?  
Table 2 shows the sample size for each category of firms in the dataset and allows a 
comparison between Italian and German firms.  As a reference group of the analyses, we 
use firms which operate outside a Value chain, that is they do not buy customized 
intermediaries and do not sell produced-to-order goods. We label these firms as “generic” 
firms. 
Turning to the comparison between Italian and German firms, table 2 shows the different 
positioning of German and Italian firms along the Value chains. The share of fully 
intermediate (INT) firms skims the 60 per cent in Italy, while it is much lower (35 per cent) 
in Germany. CPI or INT&CPI firms are instead relatively more frequent in Germany, hinting 
at the fact that German firms are more structured, thus able to organize their own Value 
chains and are, on average, located more downstream on the Value chains.10 
Such a positioning is confirmed by the analysis shown in table 3, that highlights the 
difference in the frequency of each type of firm controlling for the industry composition. 
This is done by regressing a dummy equal to one for each type of firms over a country 
dummy (Italy) and a set of industry dummies (2-digit Nace). Italy’s relative specialization in 
intermediate firms is confirmed: within each sector the probability to observe an Italian 
firm in an intermediate position in the GVC is on average 21.8 percentage points larger 
than for a German firm. Similarly, controlling for sector, German firms in a downstream 
position are 4.2 percentage points more frequent that Italian firms in the same position. 
 
4.2 Firms in the Value chains: characteristics and performance 
Table 4 reports some descriptive statistics of firms’ characteristics and performance. Each 
dependent variable (reported at the top of the table) is regressed over a set of dummies 
for each type of firm. The constant (at the bottom of each boxed table) is represented by 
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“generic” firm, not involved in vertical linkages. Intermediate (INT) firms in the dataset are 
smaller in terms of both sales and employment; in the period 2008-09, they also 
accumulated a larger decrease in total sales compared with “generic” companies. Firms 
that purchases specialized intermediate goods (CPI) and, less strikingly, firms that are both 
INT and CPI are, instead, larger and their performance in the period 2008-09 was 
somewhat comparable with the reference group. 
Yet the set of fully intermediate firms is far from being homogeneous. Compared with 
intermediate firms whose main customer is domestic (INT-DMC), the INT companies with 
a foreign main customer (INT-FMC) are larger both in terms of sales and employment. 
Notwithstanding such a heterogeneity, their performances during the crisis are instead 
quite similar. 
These patterns are also roughly confirmed within each country. The discount in terms of 
size and performance is less dramatic for the INT group in Germany; the premium for CPI 
firms is also slightly smaller. In both country, the ranking between INT-FMC and INT-DMC 
is also preserved. 
The cross-country comparison also highlights the weaknesses of the Italian productive 
structure and its disappointing performance in the crisis period (Brandolini and Bugamelli, 
2009). The gap is particularly wide in terms of employees and, in our dataset, in the 
differential in the 2008-09 performance.11 
 
4.3 Detecting heterogeneity  
So far, the EFIGE dataset has shown that intermediate firms are usually smaller and, 
during the recent crisis, they also experienced a more dramatic fall in sales. 
However, a recent stream of literature has highlighted the heterogeneous nature of both 
suppliers and final firms (Accetturo et al., 2011, 2012; Agostino et al., 2014; Giovannetti et 
al., 2014). Companies operating along the GVCs tend to differ from each other in terms of 
strategic choices to better compete in the markets. 
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In order to deduce different characteristics, we start by analyzing firm’s choices in terms 
of innovation, internationalization and human capital accumulation.  
We consider five variables: 
- share of employees with a university degree; 
- share of employees in training activities; 
- dummy for the introduction of product innovation; 
- dummy for the introduction of process innovation; 
- exports share over total turnover. 
Table 5 presents some descriptive statistics according to the positioning in the GVC; the 
table has the same structure of table 4 and presents the regression result of each 
characteristic over a set of dummy variables for each type of firms. Intermediate firms 
(INT) have less human capital and tend to be engaged more frequently in process rather 
than product innovations. More downstream firms (CPI) have a statistically significant 
higher level of human capital, product and process innovation and international exposure. 
Once again the group of intermediate firms (INT) presents relevant internal differences 
especially in terms of innovation and international projection. INT companies with a 
foreign main customer (INT-FMC) tend to be engaged more often in process innovation 
and have a share of exported sales comparable to the one registered for CPI. 
These patterns are also confirmed within each country. 
 
5 Econometric analysis  
5.1 Performance during the crisis  
We now look at the relationship between firm performance and its positioning in GVCs. 
We estimate the following equation: 
(1) igcsiiiiii DDDXCPIINTCPIINTy   321321 &  
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Where iy  is the cumulated growth rate (in log scale) of sales between 2007 and 2009 for 
firm i. iINT  is a dummy variable equal to one if SPTO sales is 100 per cent and the firm 
does not buy customized intermediaries. iCPI  is a dummy equal to one if the firm 
purchased customized intermediaries and has a SPTO sales lower than 100 per cent. 
ii CPIINT &  is a dummy equal to one if the firm is both intermediate and purchased 
customized intermediaries from abroad. By construction, iINT , iCPI , and ii CPIINT &  
are mutually exclusive. This implies that 3  can be interpreted as the discount (premium) 
in growth rate for ii CPIINT &  firms, without other manipulations. 
iX  is a set of covariates aimed at capturing firms’ heterogeneity; it includes a control for 
the initial (log) level of sales and the number of employees both measured in 2007; it also 
includes the variables described in section 4.2 (human capital and innovation) aimed at 
detecting heterogeneous behaviours of the firms and the share of the purchases of both 
total and imported intermediaries over turnover.12 sD  and cD  are sets of, respectively, 
sector and country dummies. gD  are set of dummies equal to one if the firm belongs to a 
national or foreign group. 
The coefficients of interest are 1 , 2 , and 3 . 1  captures the correlation between the 
performance during the crisis and the intermediate status of a firm in a GVC. 2  indicates 
the influence of the downstream positioning in a GVC of a firm on the dynamics of sales in 
the period 2008-09. 3  is the effect of being an intermediate firm buying customized 
intermediaries, that is the effects of an intermediate that has organized its own Value 
chain. 
Equation (1) is estimated by OLS, standard errors are robust to take into account the 
heteroskedasticity concerns. We also exclude from the regressions the first and the 99th 
percentile of the dependent variable to minimize the impact of outliers. 
 16 
Before showing the results a cautionary note is worth making. Coefficients 1 , 2 , and 
3  cannot be interpreted in causal way but, rather, as conditioned statistical associations. 
This is due to the possible presence of endogeneity problems: there can be a number of 
omitted variables (such as entrepreneur’s ability) that affect both the firm’s decisions (to 
be an intermediate or a final firm) and its performance during a period of crisis. 
Unfortunately, this problem cannot be easily solved; there are not obvious instruments 
that correlate with companies’ positioning in the GVC but not with its performance. For 
this reason, we should consider the estimates of equation (1) as multivariate stylized facts 
on the microeconomics of GVCs. 
Results are shown in table 6. 
Column (1) reports a simple specification with just INT, CPI, and INT&CPI with country and 
sector dummies. The coefficient of INT is negative and significant, thus confirming that 
being intermediate is associated with a negative performance during the crisis. 
Intermediate firms witnessed, on average, an additional fall in sales by 3.1 percentage 
point (in log scale). The coefficients of CPI and INT&CPI are, instead, positive; their point 
estimates indicate that firms engaged in the purchase of customized intermediaries (i.e. in 
a downstream position in a GVC) succeeded in limiting the drop in sales during the crisis 
by 1.7-2.2 percentage points (in log scale). However, standard errors look pretty large 
(probably due to small sample size in these groups) and this cannot rule out the possibility 
that the performance of this kind of firms is statistically different from the one of the 
reference group (generic firms). 
Column (2) adds firm-level controls: the initial period (log) levels of sales and employment, 
the share of total and imported intermediaries over sales, and group dummies. The initial 
levels of sales and employment aim at controlling for the possible presence of mean 
reversion or scale effects in firm growth; the share of total and imported intermediaries 
over sales control for the structure of firm purchases that may, in principle, affect the 
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downstream status of the firm; group affiliation proved instead particularly relevant in the 
face of the crisis (Altomonte et al., 2012). The coefficient for 2007 turnover is negative and 
significant thus showing a process of mean reversion; larger firms (measured in 
employment) attenuated instead the fall in sales during the crisis. The coefficients of INT is 
now slightly larger in modulus, while the positive but not significant estimates for 2  and 
3  are confirmed. 
In column (3) we insert controls for firm strategies and characteristics. While the three 
coefficient of interest confirm the previous results, human capital and product innovation 
variables turn out to be positive and significant. This implies that, controlling for sector, 
country, firms’ characteristics and positioning in the GVC, having a qualified workforce or 
introducing new products attenuated the negative effect of the crisis. 
For all specifications, the country dummy for Italy is larger than 20 percentage points and 
highly significant; this implies that the performance gap between Italian and German firms 
was huge. We analyze the issue in section 5.3. 
 
5.2 Heterogeneous effects 
As we have seen in section 4, intermediate firms (INT) display a very relevant 
heterogeneity when we look at the type of main customers. Intermediate firms with a 
foreign main customer (INT-FMC) are generally larger and more innovative than those 
with a domestic main customer (INT-DMC). We now investigate whether these 
characteristics had an impact on firm performance during the crisis. This is done by 
allowing different coefficients for INT-DMC and INT-FMC: 
(2)  
igcsii
DiFi
DDDXCPI
DMCINTFMCINTy




3212
11
 
Results are displayed in table 7. 
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The first column reports the coefficients for the most parsimonious specification without 
firm level controls. It is apparent that intermediate firms were hit during the crisis in a 
similar way, regardless the geographical location of the main customer. Both 
D1  and F1  
are negative and statistically significance and their point estimates are also quite similar. 
Downstream firms (CPI) confirm their positive coefficient even if, once again, standard 
errors are too large to reject their difference from zero. 
The second column reports the results when we insert all firm-level controls, with results 
much in line with the previous estimate. 
 
 
5.3 Do GVCs explain the Italy-Germany performance gap? 
As clearly shown so far, both in the descriptive and econometric analyses, during the 
2008-09 crisis Italian and German firms presented divergent dynamics as sales growth for 
Italian firms was more than 20 percentage points lower than the one registered by 
German companies. 
The Italian structural problems are well known (see Brandolini and Bugamelli, 2009, for a 
comprehensive review; Federico, 2012) and they range from the small size of the firms to 
backward labor market institutions, and include inefficiencies of public administration as 
well as rigidities in the service markets. 
In the descriptive statistics of the paper, we have also shown that, contrary to Germany, 
Italian industry is characterized by a very large number of small fully intermediate firms 
that performed very badly during the crisis, while the share of firms engaged in the 
purchase of customized intermediaries is comparatively small. 
In this section, we try to understand whether the high number of intermediate firms in 
Italy contributed to the relevant firms’ performance gap. 
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To do so, we proceed as follows. We calculate how much of the Italy-Germany firms’ 
performance gap is explained by our econometric models and then we compute the 
contribution of each set of regressors to the explained gap. 
In practice we run following five regressions: 
 
1
11 iItalyi Dy    
2
22 Sectors iItalyi Dy    
3
33 sticscharacteri FirmSectors iItalyi Dy    
4
44 Strategiessticscharacteri FirmSectors iItalyi Dy    
5
55 gPositioninStrategiessticscharacteri FirmSectors iItalyi Dy    
The total explained performance gap between German and Italian firms is given by 
15   . 
The accounting is made by comparing j  with 1j , with j=1,…,4. If jj  1  is positive, 
part of the performance gap between Germany and Italy is explained by the variables 
added in the j+1th regression. Percentage contributions to the total explained gap is 
computed as 
15
1



 jj
. 
Table 8 reports the results for these estimates. 
First we should observe that most of the Italy-Germany performance gap is left 
unexplained by the model. In the best specification (number 5), the performance gap 
remains still huge (-21 per cent). The explained performance gap is just the 13 per cent of 
the total gap ((24.25-21)/24.25 = 13 per cent). We concentrate on the explained part 
having in mind that this still represents a minority of the total difference. 
Most of the total explained performance gap (70 per cent) is attributable to firm 
characteristics such as size, human capital or innovative activity. However, different 
positioning in the GVC plays an important role as it explains almost one-fifth of the gap. 
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This is not a small number, considering that this kind of explanation of the Italy-Germany 
firms’ performance gap has been so far overlooked both by analysts and policy makers. 
 
6 Concluding remarks  
According to recent papers (Baldwin, 2011, 2009; Bems et al., 2010; Yi, 2009), GVCs have 
been one of the main transmission mechanisms of the Great Trade Collapse that severely 
and simultaneously hit all OECD countries in 2009, thus amplifying the national 
fluctuations of demand for final goods. Notwithstanding the severity, to the best of our 
knowledge there is very scant evidence on the micro impact of the crisis on firms involved 
in GVCs.  The aim of this paper is to remedy to this gap by exploiting a rich and novel 
dataset, EFIGE, that contains both qualitative and quantitative data on firms’ 
characteristics and activities; the data have been matched with balance sheet information 
from Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk). We perform our analysis by comparing German and 
Italian industrial firms. As previously underlined, these two countries provide to be an 
interesting area of application for several reasons, the first of it being German and Italian 
firms great involvement in GVCs. 
We investigate whether firms’ position along the GVCs – whether intermediate or final 
firms – as well as some firms’ strategies – to increase the level of human capital, 
innovation propensity and foreign markets penetration – play a significant role in their 
performance in 2008-09. 
The descriptive investigation shows that, within each country, intermediate firms are 
smaller than final ones in terms of both sales and employment. Their strategies are also 
somewhat less ambitious in terms of human capital accumulation and innovation. They 
are also highly heterogeneous as intermediate firms with foreign main customers are 
generally much larger and more innovative that intermediate companies mostly involved 
in national Value chains. 
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The relevance of firms’ position in the GVCs is furthermore confirmed by our econometric 
analysis. The latter shows that the crisis hit firms in GVCs in an asymmetric way. 
Intermediate firm observed a more severe contraction of sales, while firms in a more 
downstream position (i.e. purchasers of specialized intermediaries) registered a less 
critical turnover reduction. The reduction for intermediate firm was similar in magnitude 
for both domestic and international suppliers. 
Going to the cross-country’s comparison, we find that firms’ position within the GVC and 
their characteristics help in explaining part of the difference in performance between 
German and Italian firms. 
In comparison with German firms, a higher percentage of Italian industrial firms are fully 
intermediate; German firms are instead more frequently in the purchase of customized 
intermediaries, thus hinting at the fact that those companies are usually located in a 
downstream position in the GVCs. 
The cross-country comparison sheds some more light on the well-known weaknesses of 
the Italian industry in terms of average firms’ size and strategies. Firms’ strategies are 
constrained by firms’ small size. The latter severely undermines a successful participation 
in the GVCs, thus casting a shadow over Italy’s role in the current and future international 
division of labor as Italy risks to become a “factory country”, to use Baldwin (2011) 
taxonomy. On the contrary, the higher share of final firms, the larger firms’ size, partly 
explain German firms’ capacity to face the crisis and to recover. 
While some limitations in the methodology of this paper have to be addressed in our 
future research agenda, the correlation we found between firms’ position in the GVCs, 
their strategy and the ability to face the crisis have relevant implications on countries’ 
competitiveness. Implications that seem, so far, overlooked by policy makers. 
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1 For a survey of GVCs drivers, see Amador and Cabral (2014). 
2 Carvalho et al., 2014 specifically refer to the supply chain disruption caused by the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake. However 
their work is closely related to the literature, here reviewed, that analyses the role of supply chain in propagating exogenous 
shocks. 
3 For an overview that compares structural similarities and differences between Italy and Germany, see Arrighetti and 
Ninni (2012). Here we report 2010 data. However, because of the prolonged economic crisis in Italy, differences among 
the two countries have since then widened. 
4 The label “bazaar economy” comes from Sinn (2003), suggesting that Germany sells products that were not produced 
in the country. 
5 The participation index is proposed by Koopman et al. (2010),it is expressed as a percentage of gross exports and 
indicates  the share of foreign input (backward participation) and domestically produced inputs used in third countries’ 
exports (forward participation), see also De Backer and Miroudot (2014). 
6 The questionnaire can be found at the website www.efige.org. 
7 We consider all the manufacturing firms, food and beverages excluded, due to the countercyclical nature of these 
industries. 
8 Carvalho et al. (2014) uses a proprietary dataset on transactions among Japanese firms to analyze the macroeconomic 
effects of the Fukushima earthquake. 
9 In the EFIGE dataset, almost 70 per cent of firms has an SPTO equal to either 100 or zero. 
10 On the greater chances for lead firms to capture more value along the Value chain, see Dedrick et al. (2010). 
11 According to Eurostat, Industry and Trade Statistics, between 2007 and 2009, industrial production fell by 22.2 per 
cent in Italy and 16.9 per cent in Germany. This hints that the EFIGE dataset for Germany is skewed toward more 
successful firms. 
12 We have excluded the export share as it is highly collinear with INT-FMC and CPI. 
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Table 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  
Type of 
variable 
No. Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
SPTO 
Continuous 
(0-100) 
4,117 73.2 38.9 
INT Binary (0-1) 4,117 0.503 0.500 
Foreign main customer  
(INT-FMC) 
Binary (0-1) 4,117 0.242 0.428 
Domestic main customer 
(INT-DMC) 
Binary (0-1) 4,117 0.261 0.439 
CPI Binary (0-1) 4,117 0.056 0.231 
INT&CPI Binary (0-1) 4,117 0.048 0.214 
Sales in 2007 (1) Continuous 4,117 11,282 87,288 
Employees in 2007 Continuous 4,117 55.2 194.1 
Log percentage change of 
sales 2008-09 (X100) 
Continuous 4,117 -17.9 34.5 
     
Source: Authors’ calculations on EFIGE dataset. Weighted averages according to the sample design.   
SPTO: share of produced-to-order sales; INT: dummy equal to one if SPTO=100; INT-FMC: dummy equal to one if an INT firm 
has its main customer outside the country (INT-FMC+INT-DMC=INT); INT-DMC: dummy equal to one if an INT firm has its 
main customer inside the country (INT-FMC+INT-DMC=INT); CPI: dummy equal to one if the firm buys a customized 
intermediate good from abroad; INT&CPI: dummy equal to one if an intermediate firm buys a customized intermediary from 
abroad. Sales in 2007: value of sales in thousands of euros in 2007; Employees in 2007: number of employees in 2007; Log 
percentage change of sales 2008-09: difference between the log of sales in 2009 and the log of sales in 2007.  
INT, CPI, and INT&CPI are mutually exclusive. 
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Table 2 
ITALIAN AND GERMAN FIRMS IN GVCS 
  
Total sample Italy  Germany 
  
INT 1,996 
(48.5%) 
1,358 
(58.7%) 
638 
(35.4%) 
INT-FMC 991 
(24.1%) 
688 
(29.7%) 
303 
(16.8%) 
INT-DMC 1,005 
(24.4%) 
670 
(29.0%) 
335 
(18.6%) 
CPI 264 
(6.4%) 
105 
(4.5%) 
159 
(8.8%) 
INT&CPI 212 
(5.1%) 
104 
(4.5%) 
108 
(6.0%) 
Generic 1,645 
(40.0%) 
746 
(32.2%) 
899 
(49.8%) 
Total 4,117 
(100%) 
2,313 
(100%) 
1,804 
(100%) 
Source: Authors’ calculations on EFIGE dataset.  
INT: dummy equal to one if SPTO=100; INT-FMC: dummy equal to one if an INT firm has its main 
customer outside the country (INT-FMC+INT-DMC=INT); INT-DMC: dummy equal to one if an INT firm 
has its main customer inside the country (INT-FMC+INT-DMC=INT); CPI: dummy equal to one if the 
firm buys a customized intermediate good from abroad; INT&CPI: dummy equal to one if an 
intermediate firm buys a customized intermediary from abroad; Generic: residual class.  
INT, CPI, and INT&CPI are mutually exclusive. 
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Table 3 
ITALIAN AND GERMAN FIRMS IN GVCS 
(CONTROLLING FOR SECTORS) 
Value for the dummy: Italy 
  
INT 0.218*** 
(0.015) 
INT-FMC 0.118*** 
(0.013) 
INT-DMC 0.100*** 
(0.013) 
CPI -0.042*** 
(0.007) 
INT&CPI -0.012* 
(0.007) 
Generic -0.164*** 
(0.015) 
Source: Authors’ calculations on EFIGE dataset. Weighted regressions according 
to the sample design. 
OLS regression. Dependent variables are on rows. Explanatory variables: 
industry and country dummies. 
INT: dummy equal to one if SPTO=100; INT-FMC: dummy equal to one if an INT 
firm has its main customer outside the country (INT-FMC+INT-DMC=INT); INT-
DMC: dummy equal to one if an INT firm has its main customer inside the 
country (INT-FMC+INT-DMC=INT); CPI: dummy equal to one if the firm buys a 
customized intermediate good from abroad; INT&CPI: dummy equal to one if 
an intermediate firm buys a customized intermediary from abroad; Generic: 
residual class.  
INT, CPI, and INT&CPI are mutually exclusive. 
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Table 4 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIRMS 
  
Log sales in 2007 Log empl. in 2007  
Log percentage change of 
sales 2008-09 (X100) 
 Total sample 
INT -0.134*** 
(0.036) 
-0.125*** 
(0.026) 
-9.380*** 
(1.132) 
INT-FMC 0.171*** 
(0.042) 
0.016 
(0.032) 
-10.347*** 
(1.373) 
INT-DMC -0.417*** 
(0.041) 
-0.256*** 
(0.031) 
-8.483*** 
(1.343) 
CPI 0.531*** 
(0.075) 
0.386*** 
(0.083) 
2.928 
(2.390) 
INT&CPI 0.332*** 
(0.081) 
0.225*** 
(0.061) 
-0.052 
(2.568) 
Generic (constant) 8.373*** 
(0.027) 
3.454*** 
(0.020) 
-13.363*** 
(0.849) 
 Italy 
INT -0.156*** 
(0.046) 
-0.075** 
(0.030) 
-4.788** 
(1.601) 
INT-FMC 0.141** 
(0.052) 
0.044 
(0.034) 
-4.624** 
(1.864) 
INT-DMC -0.446*** 
(0.052) 
-0.190*** 
(0.035) 
-4.948** 
(1.852) 
CPI 0.626*** 
(0.111) 
0.437*** 
(0.072) 
1.727 
(3.859) 
INT&CPI 0.299** 
(0.109) 
0.269*** 
(0.061) 
3.835 
(3.808) 
Generic (constant) 8.367*** 
(0.037) 
3.292*** 
(0.024) 
-24.957*** 
(1.294) 
 Germany 
INT -0.068 
(0.060) 
0.002 
(0.050) 
-2.786** 
(1.414) 
INT-FMC 0.266** 
(0.078) 
0.232*** 
(0.064) 
-5.197*** 
(1.849) 
INT-DMC -0.342*** 
(0.073) 
-0.187** 
(0.059) 
-0.807 
(1.718) 
CPI 0.460*** 
(0.105) 
0.315*** 
(0.086) 
1.444 
(2.446) 
INT&CPI 0.347*** 
(0.122) 
0.197** 
(0.099) 
-2.801 
(2.835) 
Generic (constant) 8.378*** 
(0.039) 
3.608*** 
(0.032) 
-2.308** 
(0.912) 
Source: Authors’ calculations on EFIGE dataset.  
OLS weighted estimates according to sample design.  Dependent variables are in columns. Explanatory variables: INT: dummy equal to 
one if SPTO=100; INT-FMC: dummy equal to one if an INT firm has its main customer outside the country (INT-FMC+INT-DMC=INT); INT-
DMC: dummy equal to one if an INT firm has its main customer inside the country (INT-FMC+INT-DMC=INT); CPI: dummy equal to one if 
the firm buys a customized intermediate good from abroad; INT&CPI: dummy equal to one if an intermediate firm buys a customized 
intermediary from abroad; Generic: residual class.  
INT, CPI, and INT&CPI are mutually exclusive. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***  significant at 1%. 
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Table 5 
HETEROGENEITY ACROSS FIRMS 
  
Share w/ univ. 
Degree 
Share in 
training 
Product 
innovation 
Process 
innovation 
Export share 
 Total sample 
INT -4.252*** 
(0.404) 
-4.026*** 
(0.838) 
-0.078*** 
(0.016) 
0.056** 
(0.016) 
1.042 
(0.869) 
INT-FMC -3.103*** 
(0.489) 
-5.064*** 
(1.017) 
0.036* 
(0.019) 
0.099*** 
(0.019) 
16.331*** 
(0.958) 
INT-DMC -5.319*** 
(0.478) 
-3.063** 
(0.994) 
-0.185*** 
(0.019) 
0.017 
(0.019) 
-13.147*** 
(0.937) 
CPI 1.894** 
(0.853) 
4.138** 
(1.770) 
0.282*** 
(0.034) 
0.134*** 
(0.034) 
16.630*** 
(1.834) 
INT&CPI 0.833 
(0.916) 
1.990 
(1.902) 
0.142*** 
(0.037) 
0.168*** 
(0.037) 
14.821*** 
(1.971) 
Generic (constant) 10.388*** 
(0.303) 
17.765*** 
(0.629) 
0.496*** 
(0.012) 
0.379*** 
(0.012) 
17.906*** 
(0.652) 
 Italy 
INT -2.337*** 
(0.436) 
-0.903 
(1.009) 
-0.079*** 
(0.022) 
0.048** 
(0.022) 
-2.150* 
(1.272) 
INT-FMC -1.269** 
(0.507) 
-1.534 
(1.175) 
0.049* 
(0.026) 
0.088** 
(0.026) 
14.695*** 
(1.302) 
INT-DMC -3.377*** 
(0.503) 
-0.289 
(1.167) 
-0.206*** 
(0.025) 
0.008 
(0.026) 
-18.565*** 
(1.293) 
CPI 3.492** 
(1.152) 
4.648* 
(2.434) 
0.284*** 
(0.054) 
0.138** 
(0.054) 
15.217*** 
(3.067) 
INT&CPI 2.648** 
(1.039) 
4.644*  
(2.402) 
0.143** 
(0.053) 
0.103* 
(0.053) 
14.610*** 
(3.027) 
Generic (constant) 7.298*** 
(0.353) 
11.150*** 
(0.816) 
0.501*** 
(0.018) 
0.393*** 
(0.018) 
23.323*** 
(1.028) 
 Germany 
INT -4.237*** 
(0.763) 
-1.528 
(1.434) 
-0.084*** 
(0.025) 
0.055** 
(0.025) 
0.599 
(1.149) 
INT-FMC -2.580** 
(0.996) 
-2.854 
(1.877) 
0.012 
(0.032) 
0.100** 
(0.032) 
11.057*** 
(1.443) 
INT-DMC -5.596*** 
(0.926) 
-0.441 
(1.745) 
-0.134*** 
(0.030) 
0.017 
(0.030) 
-7.979*** 
(1.342) 
CPI 0.063 
(1.320) 
2.397 
(2.482) 
0.281*** 
(0.043) 
0.135*** 
(0.043) 
18.801*** 
(1.988) 
INT&CPI -0.738 
(1.529) 
-0.048  
(2.877) 
0.140** 
(0.050) 
0.235*** 
(0.050) 
14.375*** 
(2.304) 
Generic (constant) 13.334*** 
(0.492) 
24.074*** 
(0.925) 
0.491*** 
(0.016) 
0.365*** 
(0.016) 
12.740*** 
(0.741) 
Source: Authors’ calculations on EFIGE dataset.  
OLS weighted estimates according to sample design.  Dependent variables are in columns. Explanatory variables: INT: dummy equal to one if 
SPTO=100; INT-FMC: dummy equal to one if an INT firm has its main customer outside the country (INT-FMC+INT-DMC=INT); INT-DMC: dummy 
equal to one if an INT firm has its main customer inside the country (INT-FMC+INT-DMC=INT); CPI: dummy equal to one if the firm buys a 
customized intermediate good from abroad; INT&CPI: dummy equal to one if an intermediate firm buys a customized intermediary from 
abroad; Generic: residual class.  
INT, CPI, and INT&CPI are mutually exclusive. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***  significant at 1%. 
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Table 6 
POSITIONING IN THE GVC AND FIRMS PERFORMANCE IN 2008-09 
  
(1) (2) (3) 
    
INT -3.051** 
(1.098) 
-3.496** 
(1.111) 
-3.071** 
(1.111) 
CPI 2.212  
(2.244) 
3.430 
(2.306) 
2.924 
(2.318) 
INT&CPI 1.701 
(2.582) 
2.360 
(2.615) 
2.172 
(2.618) 
Log(employment)-2007 - 4.486*** 
(1.085) 
4.603*** 
(1.089) 
Log(sales)-2007 - -4.677*** 
(0.881) 
-4.996*** 
(0.901) 
Share of intermediaries over 
turnover (sh_int) 
 0.032 
(0.027) 
0.030 
(0.027) 
Share of intermediaries from 
abroad (sh_int_abr) 
 -0.085 
(0.075) 
-0.089 
(0.074) 
Share w/ university degree - - 0.113** 
(0.040) 
Share in training - - 0.070*** 
(0.020) 
Product innovation - - 1.776* 
(1.061) 
Process innovation - - -0.439 
(1.048) 
National Group - -0.374 
(2.048) 
-1.222  
(2.045) 
Foreign Group - -0.994 
(2.542) 
-1.916  
(2.550) 
No. industry dummies 21 21 21 
Country dummy: Italy -23.218*** 
(1.588) 
-22.236*** 
(1.179) 
-20.998*** 
(1.215) 
Constant -1.341  
(2.217) 
21.548*** 
(1.179) 
20.852*** 
(5.182) 
    
R^2 0.15 0.17 0.17 
No. Obs. 4,117 4,117 4,117 
    
Source: Authors’ calculations on EFIGE dataset.  
OLS weighted estimates according to sample design. See eq. (1). Dependent variable: percentage change in sales in 
the period 2008-09. All estimates exclude the 1st and the 99th percentile of the dependent variable. White-robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***  significant at 1%. 
INT: dummy equal to one if SPTO=100; CPI: dummy equal to one if the firm buys a customized intermediate good from 
abroad; INT&CPI: dummy equal to one if an intermediate firm buys a customized intermediary from abroad; 
log(employment) – 2007: log of employment in 2007; log(sales) – 2007: log of sales in 2007; sh_int: share of the 
purchase of intermediaries over total sales; sh_int_abr: share of the purchase of intermediaries from abroad over 
total sales; share w/ university degree: share of employees with a university degree; share in training: share of 
employees in training; product innovation: dummy equal to one if the firm carried out product innovations; process 
innovation: dummy equal to one if the firm carried out process innovations; National group: dummy equal to one if 
the firms belongs to a national group; Foreign group: dummy equal to one if the firms belongs to a foreign group. 
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Table 7 
GLOBAL OR LOCAL VALUE CHAINS? 
  
(1) (2) 
   
INT-FMC -3.429** 
(1.365) 
-2.861** 
(1.375) 
INT-DMC -2.710** 
(1.300) 
-3.271** 
(1.319) 
CPI 2.204  
(2.245) 
2.957  
(2.322) 
INT&CPI 1.691 
(2.582) 
2.195 
(2.621) 
Log(employment)-2007 - 4.606*** 
(1.090) 
Log(sales)-2007 - -5.019*** 
(0.906) 
Share of intermediaries over 
turnover (sh_int) 
- 0.029 
(0.027) 
Share of intermediaries from 
abroad (sh_int_abr) 
- -0.088 
(0.074) 
Share w/ university degree - 0.112** 
(0.040) 
Share in training - 0.070*** 
(0.019) 
Product innovation - 1.743 
(1.059) 
Process innovation - -0.448 
(1.049) 
National Group - -1.218 
(2.046) 
Foreign Group - -1.897 
(2.548) 
No. industry dummies 21 21 
Country dummy: Italy -23.209*** 
(1.058) 
-20.999*** 
(1.215) 
Constant -1.290  
(2.216) 
21.031***  
(5.211) 
   
R^2 0.16 0.17 
No. Obs. 4,117 4,117 
   
Source: Authors’ calculations on EFIGE dataset.  
OLS weighted estimates according to sample design. See eq. (1). Dependent variable: percentage change in 
sales in the period 2008-09. All estimates exclude the 1st and the 99th percentile of the dependent 
variable. White-robust standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***  
significant at 1%. 
INT-FMC: dummy equal to one if an INT firm has its main customer outside the country (INT-FMC+INT-
DMC=INT); INT-DMC: dummy equal to one if an INT firm has its main customer inside the country (INT-
FMC+INT-DMC=INT); CPI: dummy equal to one if the firm buys a customized intermediate good from 
abroad; log(employment) – 2007: log of employment in 2007; log(sales) – 2007: log of sales in 2007; sh_int: 
share of the purchase of intermediaries over total sales; sh_int_abr: share of the purchase of intermediaries 
from abroad over total sales; share w/ university degree: share of employees with a university degree; 
share in training: share of employees in training; product innovation: dummy equal to one if the firm 
carried out product innovations; process innovation: dummy equal to one if the firm carried out process 
innovations; National group: dummy equal to one if the firms belongs to a national group; Foreign group: 
dummy equal to one if the firms belongs to a foreign group. 
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Table 8 
DECOMPOSITION OF ITALIAN-GERMAN FIRMS’ PERFORMANCE  
  
Dummy Italy 
Total performance 
gap explained  
(in %) 
   
Overall difference -24.25  
Sectors -24.02 7% 
Characteristics -22.79 38% 
Strategies -21.69 34% 
Positioning -21.00 21% 
   
Source: Authors’ calculations on the EFIGE dataset. 
The column “Dummy Italy” reports the point estimate of the country dummy for Italy in each 
regression after inserting each set of variables. OLS weighted estimates (according to sample 
design). Dependent variable: percentage change in sales in the period 2008-09. All estimates 
exclude the 1st and the 99th percentile of the dependent variable. List of regressors. Overall 
difference: Dummy Italy. Sectors: Dummy Italy, Sector dummies. Characteristics: Dummy 
Italy, Sector dummies, log employment and log sales in 2007. Strategies: Dummy Italy, 
Sector dummies, log employment and log sales in 2007, sh_int, sh_abr, share of workers 
with tertiary education, share of workers in training programs, dummy for process and 
product innovation group dummies. Positioning: see strategies + INT, CPI, INT&CPI.   
 
  
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
